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The effective altruism movement (EA) is one of the most influential philosophically 
savvy movements to emerge in recent years. Effective Altruism has historically been 
dedicated to finding out what charitable giving is the most overall-effective, that is, 
the most effective at promoting or maximizing the impartial good. But some members 
of EA want the movement to be more inclusive, allowing its members to give in the 
way that most effectively promotes their values, even when doing so isn’t overall-
effective. When we examine what it means to give according to one’s values, I argue, 
we will see that this is both inconsistent with what EA is like now and inconsistent 
with its central philosophical commitment to an objective standard that can be used 
to critically analyze one’s giving. While EA is not merely synonymous with act 
utilitarianism, it cannot be much more inclusive than it is right now. 
 
 Introduction 
The effective altruism movement (EA) is one of the most influential philosophically 
savvy movements to emerge in recent years. Members of the movement, who often 
refer to themselves as EAs, have done a great deal to get philosophers and the 
general public to think about how much they can do to help others. But EA is at 
something of a crossroads. As it grows beyond its beginnings at Oxford and in the 
work of Peter Singer, its members must decide what kind of movement they want 
to have. In particular, they must decide what it truly means to be an effective 
altruist. Effective Altruism started out with what I will call a little-tent approach to 
effectiveness. Here, for something to count as “effective,” it must be overall-
effective; that is, it must be effective at promoting, securing, or maximizing the 
impartial good. This is the sense of EA that has led people to see it as coextensive 
with utilitarianism.1 (I’m leaving open for now whether little-tent EA requires us 
to maximize the impartial good or merely promote it—but we’ll return to that 
question toward the end of this paper.) The other possible approach is the big-tent 
approach. Here, “effective” merely means value-effective, that is, effective at 
promoting, securing, or maximizing some value. “Value” is more broadly construed 
than “impartial good”: people value art, political power, and community, even 
when they are known to contribute very little to the impartial good. 
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 So far, EA has generally confined itself to a little tent. For example, in 
defining EA, Wiblin excludes from the movement those who believe that we ought 
to do good but who don’t think this obligates us to try to maximize the impartial 
good.2 By excluding these people, Wiblin effectively defines EA as a movement 
dedicated to overall-effectiveness.3 The document “What Is Effective Altruism?,” 
co-written by a range of EAs, excludes value-effectiveness even more explicitly: 
“Effective altruists focus on improving lives. . . . There might be other things of 
value as well--promoting art, or preserving the natural environment--but that’s not 
what effective altruism is about.”4  
 But there are signs that some EAs would like to change the size of their tent. 
Gabriel, for example, recommends that EA broaden the kind of advice it gives, 
permitting “advisees to choose the values they consider morally relevant (within 
certain parameters) and produce recommendations that optimize the impact” on 
these values.5 This version of EA appears to take value-effectiveness as its 
criterion.6 Gabriel moves to the big tent because he believes that this version of EA 
is not susceptible to what he sees as the weaknesses of the little tent.7 
Conversations I’ve had with EAs indicate that Gabriel isn’t alone here; some people 
who are uncomfortable with EA’s roots in utilitarianism are still attracted to the 
movement for its focus on evidence-based giving. They think of themselves as EAs, 
and yet they want to give to causes because they align with their values. 
 In the debate about which criterion of effectiveness to adopt, one side has 
a clear advantage. Broadening EA to include value-effectiveness would require 
abandoning some of EA’s central philosophical commitments: most notably, the 
view that we should measure our giving using an objective standard. While this 
does not mean that EA membership is limited to consequentialists, it does mean 
that EA cannot include all who are interested in doing good, and it may limit the 
public appeal of EA. For EA to be EA, the tent must stay little. 
1. Tents and Values 
To see why value-effectiveness is incompatible with EA, consider: 
Reproductive Access I: As a woman, Anne values reproductive rights. The 
value Anne wants to promote is securing reproductive rights for everyone. 
Therefore, Anne supports charities that are effective at ensuring 
reproductive access for very poor women in the developing world. 
Reproductive Access I is clearly compatible with big-tent EA. Anne has a value that’s 
important to her—reproductive rights—and she’s done her research as to what 
can most effectively promote that value. She’s thought about why she holds that 
value: she cares about the good, and she cares about increasing the happiness, 
status, and agency of women. But it’s a value Anne holds because of her own life 
experiences, her projects, and so on, not because she believes it’s the best way to 
pursue overall-effectiveness. 
Effective Altruism: How Big Should the Tent Be? (preprint)  Amy Berg 
3 
 
 So is Reproductive Access I compatible with little-tent EA? Here, Anne is 
pursuing the value she cares about in a way that does quite a lot to promote the 
impartial good, since her giving targets those in great need. And, depending on the 
organizations Anne directs her giving to, her giving could be compatible with the 
recommendations of at least one EA group. The Life You Can Save (TLYCS) includes 
two charities dealing primarily with aspects of reproductive care (the Fistula 
Foundation and Population Services International) on its list of recommended 
charities.8 In order for Anne’s giving to be overall-effective, she should choose to 
direct her giving to one or both of those charities. If she does, then so far, her giving 
in Reproductive Access I is the kind that is encouraged by little-tent EA. 
 But on the other hand, neither GiveWell nor Giving What We Can (GWWC) 
includes a charity dealing primarily with reproductive care on its list of top 
charities (nor even among the runners-up).9 These prominent EA organizations 
disagree with TLYCS about whether any charities focusing on reproductive access 
are among the greatest contributors to the impartial good. If these organizations, 
not TLYCS, are correctly interpreting the available evidence, then there are other, 
more overall-effective ways that Anne could spend her money than by giving to 
reproductive-rights charities. Plus, even if Anne’s giving is itself effective, her 
motivation may be to give according to her values, not according to what is most 
overall-effective. Anne’s giving may live up to EA standards, but Anne herself might 
not. Thus even Reproductive Access I—even giving that helps save very poor 
women from suffering and death—cannot receive the full-throated support of all 
EAs. 
 Now consider: 
Reproductive Access II: As an American woman, Beatriz values reproductive 
rights, and she’s disturbed by the ways in which reproductive access has 
been curtailed by recent laws and policies. The value she wants to promote 
is securing reproductive rights for Americans. Therefore, Beatriz supports 
charities that are effective at providing reproductive access for women in 
the United States and that mobilize to oppose the curtailment of 
reproductive access. 
If Reproductive Access I was probably incompatible with little-tent EA, Reproductive 
Access II is definitely incompatible with it. While in Reproductive Access I, Anne’s 
donation went to help the very poor, very few American women qualify as “very 
poor.” Giving to support reproductive care in the United States will do much less to 
promote the impartial good than giving to reproductive care more broadly. 
 And yet, like Reproductive Access I, Reproductive Access II is compatible with 
big-tent EA. Big-tent EA licenses giving that supports one’s values. While 
“promoting reproductive access in the United States” is more geographically 
specific than “promoting reproductive access generally,” it’s not ad hoc. Beatriz 
came to hold that value for the same reasons as Anne came to hold her value in 
Reproductive Access I: it’s based on her identity, her projects, and interests. If 
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Beatriz’s value seems less legitimate, that might be because it does less to promote 
the impartial good—but obviously that kind of requirement is ruled out in the big 
tent. If Reproductive Access I is permissible for big-tent EA, so is Reproductive Access 
II. 
 And so is: 
Reproductive Access III: Chuck lives in a wealthy community in which health 
care is generally good. Still, some women receive care that is merely 
adequate rather than absolutely top-notch. Chuck’s little sister works for 
an organization that works toward improving the quality of reproductive 
care in their community. The values Chuck wants to promote are 
reproductive access and support for the projects of people he knows and 
cares about. Therefore, Chuck supports his sister’s organization, which is 
effective at securing reproductive rights within their community but which 
limits its focus to their community specifically. 
We are now far removed from where we started. Reproductive Access III is clearly 
not the kind of giving licensed by little-tent EA. Chuck is giving to women who are 
already extremely well-off by global standards, and who in fact already have some 
access to reproductive care. 
 And yet big-tent EA should support Reproductive Access III. Chuck is, once 
again, operating on his values: the value of supporting his associates and the value 
of securing reproductive access. There is no difference between the structure of 
this case and the structure of the two previous cases. Although the giving in 
Reproductive Access III is extremely inefficient by little-tent standards, big-tent EA 
has no reason to criticize giving in the style of Reproductive Access III. If EAs think 
that the giving in Reproductive Access I and/or II seems fine (maybe not optimal, 
but at least reasonably good), but the giving in Reproductive Access III is off the 
table, then they must explain: Why was giving according to one’s values, rather 
than the impartial good, permissible in Anne’s and/or Beatriz’s case, but not in 
Chuck’s? What is it about Chuck’s values that’s out of line? But it’s not clear what 
resources big-tent EA has to draw that line, since it cannot decide according to 
whether Chuck’s values promote the impartial good. 
 The moral of these three stories is clear: once we start down the path of 
allowing giving according to one’s values, giving quickly comes to look nothing like 
the giving EAs currently promote. Because of the wide range—in content and 
specificity—of values a person can reasonably have, a value-effective EA would 
encompass a range of giving, from that which targets the very poor to that which 
stays within a wealthy community. 
 What, then, is big-tent EA against? Consider: 
Reproductive Access IV: Dahlia is a mean person who wants those around 
her to suffer. She’s concluded that one way to make people suffer is to make 
sure they can’t afford reproductive care. Dahlia gives extensively to 
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organizations specifically intended to prevent access to reproductive care. 
In other words, big-tent EA can surely condemn giving according to nefarious 
values—giving intended to cause harm, suffering, or pain. Dahlia may be 
“effective,” but she’s no altruist. The values of Reproductive Access IV are not values 
directed at any reasonable conception of the good, impartial or not. 
 Is Chuck like Dahlia? In Reproductive Access III, he’s failing to prevent harms 
since he’s taking money he could have spent on cures for schistosomiasis and 
spending it on relatively well-funded causes instead. As long as Chuck knows that 
his money could be doing more, he may be demonstrating a lack of regard for those 
in need. But if that’s true of Chuck, then it’s also true of Beatriz, who is 
demonstrating a lack of regard for those in need outside the United States. And it’s 
even true of Anne, who is demonstrating a lack of regard for the very poor in 
greatest need (for whom access to reproductive care may not be the first priority). 
If a lack of regard for those who are worse-off is your complaint against Chuck, then 
it’s hard to see how you aren’t just back in the little tent. 
 What separates Chuck (and Anne and Beatriz) from Dahlia must be that his 
values are not themselves nefarious. If the world’s more pressing problems were 
taken care of, little-tent EA would certainly allow us to aid members of wealthy 
communities. Improving reproductive access in wealthy communities certainly 
contributes to the impartial good; it just doesn’t contribute as much as other 
options would, given the situation today. Clearly, there’s nothing in these values 
that’s inherently bad; they’re just at odds with little-tent EA given the context we’re 
currently in. Even big-tent EA ought to be able to condemn truly nefarious values 
(using something like Gabriel’s “parameters” for determining which values are 
morally acceptable), but the values at stake in Reproductive Access III aren’t 
nefarious. 
 Besides the pursuit of nefarious values, consider cases such as: 
Reproductive Access V: As an American woman, Evelyn places some value 
on reproductive rights, and she’s generally against the recent attempts to 
curtail them, but it’s not her first priority. On her commute home, Evelyn 
hears a particularly upsetting story about reproductive rights on the news. 
When she gets home and checks the mail, she sees that a reproductive-
rights organization has sent her a flyer requesting donations. Because she’s 
upset, she writes them a check without bothering to research whether 
they’re more effective than other reproductive-rights organizations at 
mobilizing against the curtailment of these rights. 
Evelyn’s giving here is not value-effective, given her values. First, the value of 
reproductive rights isn’t especially important to her; she’s upset, and she’s acting 
on a spur-of-the-moment emotional response. Second, she’s not trying to pursue 
that value effectively. She doesn’t know, nor has she tried to find out, whether the 
charity she’s giving to is a good way to support her goals. In Reproductive Access V, 
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Evelyn is approaching instrumental irrationality, since she’s pursuing a goal with 
no idea whether the means she’s chosen will get her there.10 
2. Problems with Big-Tent EA (from an EA 
Standpoint) 
So Reproductive Access IV and V are the kinds of cases big-tent EA condemns—cases 
in which agents badly pursue values, or pursue bad values, or pursue values they 
don’t care about. But big-tent EA cannot condemn any of Reproductive Access I -III. 
Because the actors in those cases each acted according to what would most 
effectively accomplish their values, their actions should be praised by big-tent EA. 
 But this shows that big-tent EA is not really EA at all. Big-tent EA is not 
compatible with what EA is; but it is also not compatible with why EA is that way. 
A big tent is neither compatible with the positions taken by major EA groups, nor 
with the reasons given for those positions. Effective Altruism may not be as little a 
tent as some have supposed, but it can only preserve its distinctive philosophical 
commitments—most notably, its commitment to an objective standard for giving—
if it stays a little tent (although, as we will see, not as little as some might think). 
2.1 What EA Is 
Big-tent EA is not compatible with EA as it currently exists. Although Gabriel and 
others have argued that EA should help donors to choose their own values and 
maximize their giving in pursuit of those values, the major EA organizations do not 
count value-effective giving as effective giving. Giving What We Can’s pledge, for 
example, requires its members to “give at least ten percent of what [they] earn to 
whichever organizations can most effectively use it to improve the lives of 
others.”11 Giving to combat climate change is generally ruled out, on the grounds 
that “it is very expensive to make any headway” on this issue.12 There is no 
exception made if fighting climate change is an important value to you. Peter 
Singer’s group The Life You Can Save (TLYCS) runs a similar pledge, and its 
guidelines are even clearer about what doesn’t count: you cannot use money 
donated in your own community, even if it helps the poor, to fulfill your pledge to 
donate, since the poor near you are almost certainly not those in greatest need.13 
Once again, what matters is overall-effectiveness. Finally, the Centre for Effective 
Altruism (CEA) criticizes David Geffen’s donations to the Lincoln Center and the 
Museum of Modern Art, pointing out that “much more good could have been 
accomplished if that money had been spent on more pressing needs.”14 If the CEA 
cared about value-effectiveness rather than overall-effectiveness, Geffen’s gifts 
(assuming they represent his values) would be praiseworthy, rather than 
criticizable. 
2.2 Why EA Is That Way 
So big-tent EA is generally incompatible with the guidelines for giving espoused by 
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major organizations in the movement. But maybe that’s not a problem. Movements 
evolve. “Earning to give” was once a major part of the EA organization 80,000 
Hours; now it’s downplayed.15 As more people become interested in EA and add 
their perspectives, talents, and views to the movement, EA will certainly make 
some further changes. 
 But movements can only change so much while still retaining the core 
philosophical commitments that make them coherent as movements. In 
considering whether and how EA should grow, Cotton-Barratt notes that a 
movement with more popular ideas will have a different growth pattern from that 
of a less appealing movement.16 Excising EA’s focus on overall-effectiveness would, 
almost by definition, make it a more popular movement. Those who think overall-
effectiveness is the right criterion on which to give would still be free to do so; those 
who think value-effectiveness is the right criterion would be newly welcome. But 
Cotton-Barratt warns that this tool should be used carefully: “The value of 
spreading a different movement may be substantially different, and it could be too 
easy to throw the baby out with the bathwater by removing unpopular 
components.”17 So what’s EA’s “baby”? We need to know more about the distinctive 
philosophical commitments of EA.18 
 Effective Altruism’s crucial philosophical commitment is that it provides a 
single objective standard by which we can analyze our giving. On its own, this 
objective standard could be compatible with either the big or the little tent. The 
little tent has an objective standard: Does your gift do the most it can (according to 
your knowledge at the time) to promote the impartial good? The big tent has an 
objective standard too: Does your gift do the most it can to promote your values, 
whatever those happen to be? Both of these standards are objective in some sense. 
Little-tent EAs have developed lists that purport to give an objective answer about 
how you can give most overall-effectively (although they acknowledge that these 
lists are based on incomplete data). While it may be more difficult to determine 
what your values really are, and perhaps more difficult to figure out how to most 
effectively promote them, there are objectively true and false answers in the big 
tent too. (In Reproductive Access V, Evelyn’s spur-of-the-moment donation was 
objectively a bad way to promote her values.) But the standard of promoting the 
impartial good—the standard connected with overall-effectiveness—best captures 
the other philosophical commitments of EA. 
 First, this standard is more fully objective. Value-effective giving is assessed 
by an objective standard of how well you succeed at promoting a subjectively held 
value. Since value-effective EA would not be in the business of criticizing values 
(unless the values were truly nefarious), it would not hold all its members to 
precisely the same standard--which overall-effective EA does, since its standard 
does not depend on an individual’s values. 
 Second, holding everyone to the same standard allows for your values to 
come under critical scrutiny from your peers. Wiblin warns that if EA’s emphasis 
on justifying your plans “to a high standard” were diluted, by allowing “any plan to 
improve the world that isn’t really ineffective,” then “people [in EA] would stop 
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feeling any pressure from their peers to . . . change approaches.”19 If EA shifts to a 
bigger tent, there is no longer reason to pressure peers to give according to 
anything but their own values. 
 Third, EAs’ commitment to the impartial good allows them to avoid various 
psychological phenomena they see as problematic. Those who give overall-
effectively are the kind of people who will, according to Hutchinson, display “open-
mindedness” since they will be willing to give to a wide range of charities.20 
Relatedly, overall-effective giving is supposed to avoid bias. The Effective Altruism 
Foundation claims that if we become emotionally attached to a particular cause, “it 
might compromise our ability to evaluate causes objectively.”21 Since there is so 
much need in the world, and our judgments about how to best meet that need are 
still uncertain, we should give according to a fully objective standard. This is how 
we can avoid confirmation bias—if a project, or strategy, becomes particularly 
important to me, then I might unintentionally overestimate how effective that 
project or strategy is. 
 Finally, those who are committed to overall-effectiveness will 
(theoretically) do good in perpetuity.22 Suppose that Congress passes a law that 
guarantees full funding for reproductive care for all Americans. Beatriz (from 
Reproductive Access II) no longer has to worry about the value that drove her giving. 
She might stop giving altogether. Someone who is committed to overall-
effectiveness, on the other hand, will switch causes once the top cause has received 
enough funding or is otherwise no longer an issue. Of course, this kind of concern 
only makes a difference at the margins. Many of the causes that people donate to 
appear destined to remain problems indefinitely, and many values people hold 
don’t have an upper limit (is there such a thing as completely fulfilling the need for 
art?). But the more granular a value is, the more likely that the work I can do to 
promote that value will eventually be exhausted (there’s only so much Chuck can 
do to support his sister in Reproductive Access III). 
 My purpose here is not to determine whether these philosophical 
commitments are the right ones. The Effective Altruism Foundation claims that our 
biases get in the way of overall-effective giving; EA’s critics might retort that those 
“biases” are guides to discovering your own values and projects, to thinking 
critically about how you want to live your life. Wiblin values a single, objective 
standard for giving; EA’s critics might hold that that standard narrowly constrains 
the values we ought to be allowed to promote.23 But it’s clear from this discussion 
of EA values that EA would lose a lot of what makes it EA if it were to shift from 
overall-effectiveness to value-effectiveness. 
 We can see this even more clearly when we consider what a big-tent EA 
would really look like. For one thing, big-tent EA would have a marked change in 
focus. It would still want to encourage everyone to give, but this encouragement 
would be centered around individual values, not the impartial good. So EA would 
encourage those who don’t give at all to start giving according to their own values. 
Effective Altruism could look into why some people give while others don’t and 
could conduct persuasion campaigns to get more people to give. (That big-tent EA 
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uses a criterion of value-effectiveness might make it more attractive STET since 
there would be no requirement to restrict giving in ways that some people find 
alienating.) Rather than avoiding what little-tent EA sees as cognitive biases, big-
tent EA might play off of those so-called biases (seeing them instead as projects, 
commitments, aspects of identity, and so on). 
 Second, big-tent EA organizations would focus on helping potential donors 
to understand what kind of giving would best support their values, rather than on 
encouraging people to give to the few overall-effective charities. For someone 
whose values are like those of Beatriz in Reproductive Rights II, EA organizations 
could provide a list of reproductive-rights charities doing effective work in the 
United States. For the David Geffens of the world, EA would need to research 
effective arts organizations in New York. And so on. There might be peer pressure 
among EAs to give somewhere, but there would not be peer pressure to give 
anywhere in particular or to revise one’s values. 
 Finally, in service of these goals, big-tent EA could help people better 
understand what their own values are. Chuck might be faced with a choice in 
Reproductive Access III: Should he give to the reproductive-rights organization his 
sister works for, or should he give to a more effective organization serving his 
community? Big-tent EA could help him make the choice between these 
organizations by running surveys, administering quizzes, or holding counseling 
sessions that would lead him to understand what his own values are and how 
important each value is to him. 
 Seen this way, it becomes clear that big-tent EA is simply a sort of 
cheerleader for encouraging people to give however they see fit, as long as it’s 
instrumentally rational. If EA evolves like this, it will no longer be a distinct 
movement. Instead, it will stand for a pretty commonsense belief: that if two 
charities are directed at the exact same (granularly specified) value, you should 
give to the more effective one. Big-tent EA is indistinct from commonsense beliefs 
about how one ought to promote one’s values. 
 In fact, this kind of EA might be worse than useless. Since big-tent EA would 
no longer stand for a distinctive philosophical belief, and since it never focused on 
a particular cause, it would be in danger of becoming otiose. The Red Cross may not 
stand for a philosophically controversial position, but at least it’s staked out a cause 
area. Big-tent EA would be more like a clearinghouse for lots of different causes 
and lots of different values. If the costs of running EA organizations (paying staff, 
maintaining web servers, creating and disseminating information) outweigh the 
benefits of having such a clearinghouse, we might just want to cut out the 
middleman entirely. 
 There are three things EAs should take away from this discussion. First, the 
cases of Reproductive Access I -III show that if EA admits value-effective giving, then 
many different ways to give will count as effective, even if that giving exclusively 
benefits the well-off. Cases that EAs frequently criticize, such as Geffen’s gifts to the 
arts, look laudable from a big-tent perspective. Second, if we look at the statements 
of flagship EA organizations and people, it’s clear that value-effective giving is not 
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what they have in mind. But, of course, that’s exactly what Gabriel and others 
advocate changing. So, third, EAs should be aware of how many of their 
philosophical commitments they would give up by changing to a big-tent EA. Of 
course, EAs own their movement, and it’s ultimately up to them to decide what kind 
of movement they want, but value-effectiveness represents a substantial break 
with the philosophical commitments that EAs presently hold. They cannot both 
preserve these commitments and enlarge their tent. 
3. A Big Tent for Little-Rent Reasons? 
Here’s one other possibility. The founders of EA are, for the most part, fairly 
standard act utilitarians. For this group, there’s nothing wrong with being quiet 
about your real motives, or maybe even actively engaging in deception, if doing so 
maximizes the impartial good. This could lead to an EA movement that is both big- 
and little-tent: its public face encourages people to give more in whatever way is 
value-effective, while its private face remains focused on the overall-effectiveness 
that was EA’s original target. If big-tent EA could get people excited about giving, 
over time, it could expose them to “real” EA—to the idea that the giving they’re 
doing could be much more overall-effective. 
 This might lead to some rhetorical changes in how EA approaches 
charitable giving. Remember when the “Ice Bucket Challenge” was popular back in 
2014? People were dumping buckets of water on themselves in order to raise 
money to fund research into ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis; Lou Gehrig’s 
disease). A number of EAs vocally criticized the Ice Bucket Challenge, arguing that 
the funds it was raising for ALS research were “cannibalizing” funds that could have 
gone to more effective charities.24 If EAs were to adopt a big-tent strategy for little-
tent reasons, they might approach the Ice Bucket Challenge differently, either by 
co-opting the ice bucket strategy for overall-effective charities, or by trying to 
recruit people who had already done the Ice Bucket Challenge for ALS into 
becoming donors to overall-effective charities afterward. In fact, MacAskill implies 
that EAs could co-opt this strategy, in an article entitled “This Week, Let’s Dump a 
Few Ice Buckets to Wipe Out Malaria Too” that was intended as a follow-up to his 
original piece criticizing the Ice Bucket Challenge; other effective altruists made 
similar arguments.25 The Ice Bucket Challenge got people temporarily excited 
about giving; EA could pick up on that enthusiasm, redirect it, and make it more 
permanent by having a big tent in front and a smaller tent in back. 
 Insofar as this strategy involves dishonesty, it’s bound for trouble. It may 
be morally acceptable to the strict act utilitarians who were the first EAs, since this 
kind of duplicity wouldn’t be impermissible (in fact, would be obligatory), on their 
view, as long as it maximized overall utility. But it’s not clear that even a strict 
utilitarian calculus would come out in favor of a big tent for little-tent reasons. 
People tend not to like feeling like they’re being manipulated. If people came to 
believe that EA had been rhetorically duplicitous—if they felt used, manipulated, 
or tricked by a little-tent organization with a big-tent face, that might turn them 
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away from EA. Even worse, EA might be a cautionary tale used by those who are 
looking for an excuse to avoid all charitable giving whatsoever (“See, I told you 
those do-gooders couldn’t be trusted!”). This strategy might also diminish EA’s 
appeal for non-act-utilitarian members, since at least some more deontologically 
inclined little-tent EAs might see something wrong with using big-tent EA 
supporters as mere means to an eventual little-tent EA end. So if there’s room in a 
little tent for people who are not strict act utilitarians to be EA (and as I’ll lay out 
below, I think there is), those people may be uncomfortable with a movement that 
is dishonest about its true theoretical beliefs. 
 But a big tent out front, with a little tent in the back, need not involve 
dishonesty. A different version of this strategy would counsel EAs to be open and 
honest about their beliefs. EAs could say: “We think that everyone should give 
according to overall effectiveness, but we recognize not everyone agrees with us. 
We still think you should give, even if you do so less effectively.” This one is risky 
too. First, I think it runs the risk of being condescending. If EAs are encouraging 
others to give how they think best, but at the same time are saying that other views 
on giving are misguided, that could make non-EA givers feel diminished. Even if 
EAs can successfully not condescend to the people they’re trying to attract, I have 
doubts about the effectiveness of this strategy. I don’t know that it’s very 
motivating to hear that you should give, but that the way you want to give is less 
valuable or praiseworthy than the way EAs give is. The more honest EAs are about 
how they think of effectiveness and why it matters, the harder it will be for them to 
attract people who are open to giving but inclined to disagree about how to give. 
 So I have my doubts as to whether a big tent for little-tent reasons could be 
a successful strategy for EAs to pursue. But whether EAs pursue this strategy 
openly or dishonestly, it’s just a strategy. If we’re investigating the possibility of a 
big tent for little-tent reasons, then the theoretical argument has already been won 
by little-tent EA; we’re just arguing now about which pragmatic strategy is more 
effective. All of the philosophical work is being done by the little-tenters, even if EA 
appears to have changed. Even if EA were to adopt this strategy, which I think is 
dicey both morally (if it involves dishonesty) and pragmatically (if it can’t 
motivate), the tent that matters would stay the same size. 
4. What about Different EA-Endorsed Charities? 
I’ve argued that EA cannot evolve beyond its current view of effectiveness as 
overall-effectiveness. But is this really consistent with EA practice so far? Perhaps 
EAs really do permit giving in a value-effective way. Evidence for this might be the 
split between EA organizations focused on animal causes (such as Animal Charity 
Evaluators, or ACE) and those whose recommended charities mostly help humans 
(such as GiveWell and GWWC). The human-focused charities disagree with each 
other too. As we saw back in Reproductive Access I, TLYCS endorses the Fistula 
Foundation, but GWWC and GiveWell do not. 
 We shouldn’t overestimate this split, though: these organizations have a lot 
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of members in common, share many guiding values, and generally support rather 
than rival each other. But they do have different areas of focus, and someone 
donating 10 percent of his income to effective charities has to decide whether to 
give that money to animal- or human-related causes. If it’s permissible for an EA to 
give to either human or animal charities, then it might be permissible because 
value-effectiveness is the right criterion for deciding where to give. Conversely, if 
overall-effectiveness is the right criterion of effectiveness, then GiveWell and ACE 
can’t both be right. Either all EAs should be working exclusively on human causes, 
or they should all be giving exclusively to animal charities. 
 But value-effectiveness isn’t what’s doing the work here. Animal Charity 
Evaluators pursues animal-related causes because we don’t know whether animal 
or human charities are the most overall-effective ways to give. Animal Charity 
Evaluators, GiveWell, and GWWC share a commitment to overall-effectiveness, but 
those who give to ACE-recommended charities believe that these may be the most 
overall-effective. Animal Charity Evaluators and GiveWell, and also GiveWell and 
GWWC, disagree not about whether overall- or value-effectiveness is the right 
sense of effectiveness; they just may have disagreements about how to calculate 
what is most overall-effective. This is, very reasonably, due to the extreme difficulty 
of calculating what does the best job of maximizing happiness and relieving 
suffering, particularly where animals are concerned. But if the research comes in, 
and it turns out that animal charities are clearly more effective, we would expect 
EA donors to human causes to switch to animal causes. 
5. What about a Medium Tent? 
But what if that doesn’t happen? What if the evidence comes in, and animal 
charities are more effective at relieving suffering than human-focused charities are, 
but donors to GWWC-endorsed charities don’t switch their giving? Donors to ACE 
and GWWC may be giving in order to promote the impartial good and yet disagree 
about what that impartial good is, even after all the evidence is in. If they do, this 
suggests that there are more tents to try out. 
 Hutchinson proposes a kind of medium tent in a discussion of why EA is 
“cause-neutral” (by which she means that EAs commit to giving according to the 
impartial good rather than on the basis of “personal connections” to a cause).26 She 
writes: 
But being cause neutral is not the same as valuing everything. Different 
people value different things, and there are numerous plausible ethical 
systems. You might or might not value complexity and diversity; you might 
or might not value non-human animals; you might or might not value lives 
which haven’t yet to come into existence [sic]. The more inclusive your 
moral system, the more likely you are to feel that moral systems that 
exclude some of the things you value are partisan. For example someone 
who values non-human animals might feel that someone whose moral 
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system does not attribute value to non-human animals was being partisan, 
just as someone who helps those near to them rather than those far away 
is being partisan.27 
This helps us to see what a medium tent might look like.28 Like the big tent, the 
medium tent takes as its definition of effectiveness overall-effectiveness. So once 
again, the medium tent includes only EAs who are committed to giving in ways that 
are effective at promoting, securing, or maximizing the impartial good. But the 
medium tent allows for disagreement (such as that between ACE and GWWC) 
about what the impartial good consists of. This would not be as big as the big tent, 
which licenses giving according to your values, even when they diverge from what 
you believe would best promote the impartial good. But it’s not as little as the little 
tent, since the medium tent includes people who give to many different kinds of 
causes for different reasons. The medium tent offers more theoretical consistency 
than the big tent and more inclusivity than the little tent. But there are a few things 
potential medium-tenters should keep in mind. 
 First, many EAs probably think some reasonable value systems are worse 
than others. Look at how Hutchinson describes the different value systems—some 
“value complexity and diversity” (usually seen as good things) while others do not. 
Some value non-human animals, while some are “partisan,” not exactly a term of 
praise in EA circles.29 This is hardly a neutral weighing of pros and cons, suggesting 
that coexistence in the medium tent may not always be harmonious. 
 And that may be as it should be. I won’t construct a full case series for the 
medium tent, but we can see how criticisms will be parallel to those leveled against 
the big tent in Reproductive Access I -III. Consider: 
Famine Relief: Francis’s value system holds that we have moral obligations 
only to humans. The charity that is the most effective at relieving human 
suffering in a recent famine is a charity that provides factory-farmed meat 
to those without food. In accordance with his value system, Francis donates 
to this charity, thereby increasing the suffering of some number of animals. 
Francis’s value system seems like the kind of system about which Hutchinson 
would say reasonable people could disagree. So this kind of giving seems to fit 
within the medium tent. But the benefit to Francis’s version of the impartial good 
will come at a cost to the standard EA view of the impartial good, since Francis’s 
giving causes additional animal suffering. This kind of medium-tent giving may 
actually be worse, by little-tent standards, than Anne’s giving in Reproductive Access 
I. At least there, Anne was doing nearly as much good as she could. 
 In looking at the series of big-tent cases, we saw that it was going to be very 
difficult to draw a line between value-effective giving that counted as EA and value-
effective giving that did not. The same is true here. There are plenty of reasonable 
value systems that have a picture of what counts as the “impartial good” that is 
different from the little-tent EA picture. Once again, either EA must make room for 
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value systems that are sharply at odds with what would have seemed to be its core 
theoretical commitments, or it must find some way to draw a line between 
reasonable value systems that can count as EA and those that can not. There may 
be other possible medium tents, but the problems shared by the big and medium 
tents suggest that parallel problems will recur for any attempt to make EA more 
inclusive. 
 Finally, the costs of expanding to a medium tent have relatively small gains. 
The advantage of the big tent was that it allowed anyone in who was interested in 
giving effectively in accordance with her values, even if she acknowledged that 
pursuing her values wasn’t the best way to achieve the impartial good. The medium 
tent can’t include those people since it only includes those whose giving effectively 
promotes the impartial good (as they define it). Anyone who wants to give 
effectively in accordance with her projects is still outside the medium tent. 
6. How Little Is the Little Tent? 
If EA has to be a little tent, what do we mean by “little”? Our discussion so far has 
shown that you must be committed to the pursuit of (a particular understanding 
of) overall-effectiveness rather than value-effectiveness. This little tent doesn’t 
exclude nonconsequentialists. There are already nonconsequentialists within EA; 
for one, Ramakrishnan argues that a Kamm-style analysis of giving shows that 
overall-effective giving is morally required.30 There are familiar 
nonconsequentialist moral theories that are compatible with EA; Ross’s duty of 
beneficence, although situated within a larger deontological moral theory, is a duty 
to maximize the impartial good.31 These examples show that Lichtenberg is wrong 
to claim that EA just is consequentialism.32 
 But Lichtenberg isn’t very wrong. Any nonconsequentialist who doesn’t 
accept the overall-effectiveness reading of EA gets kicked out of the little tent. For 
many nonconsequentialists, beneficence should be a value-effective duty. It is 
permissible, these nonconsequentialists argue, to believe that beneficence is 
inseparable from one’s other values, commitments, and projects.33 For these 
nonconsequentialists, and possibly for some consequentialists, too, there’s no 
room in the little tent. 
 So the commitment to overall-effectiveness includes utilitarians, many 
other consequentialists, and some nonconsequentialists, while excluding a 
significant number of nonconsequentialists. There’s another dimension to the tent 
that’s relevant too. At the beginning of this paper, I described a commitment to 
overall-effectiveness as a commitment to promote, secure, or maximize the 
impartial good. Once we see that EAs are required to give in an overall-effective 
way, the size of the tent will vary further depending on whether they are also 
required to maximize the impartial good (by giving to the level of marginal utility, 
as Singer describes in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”) or merely to promote it, 
by giving at a lower level than that.34 If I give $5 once to the Against Malaria 
Foundation, am I an effective altruist? 
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 Effective Altruism organizations currently require some level of giving, 
although none requires maximizing the impartial good. Giving What We Can asks 
its members to pledge 10 percent of their income; The Life You Can Save has an 
income-based sliding scale.35 Still, while the commitment to overall-effectiveness 
falls straightforwardly out of EA’s philosophical commitments, a commitment to a 
particular level of overall-effective giving does not. To survive as a philosophically 
coherent movement, EA needs a commitment to the impartial good more than it 
needs a commitment to maximizing the good. If EA requires its members to give at 
a particular level, the message is still that giving more would be better. But if EA 
requires its members to give according to their values, that doesn’t send a clear 
message that giving according to overall-effectiveness would be better. Perhaps 
this shows that the commitment to overall-effectiveness, not the commitment to a 
certain level of giving, is the true core idea of EA. 
 Or perhaps overall-effectiveness and a certain level of giving are both core 
ideas of EA, in which case EA will have to figure out what that level is and why its 
members are required to give that much.36 Depending on how that argument 
shakes out, it may be that when it comes to the level of required giving, the little 
tent has slightly more room.37 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that EA must be a little tent rather than a big tent. In order to be a 
distinct movement that retains its core philosophical beliefs, rather than just being 
a cheerleader for instrumental rationality, EA must adopt a criterion of overall- 
rather than value-effectiveness. 
 Still, none of this means that EA is right to adopt overall- rather than value-
effectiveness. Effective Altruism may fail to recognize the importance of values 
other than the impartial good—the importance of associative duties, the role giving 
can play in forming and contributing to an individual’s identity and commitments, 
the space for personal prerogatives, and so on. This paper does not tackle the 
question of whether EA is the right kind of approach to take to beneficence. But 
since EA has made significant contributions to the philosophical debates around 
giving, I think it’s in all our interests to clarify what EA is and what it stands for. 
 
Rhode Island College 
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